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Farmworkers in the United States are recognized as an environmental justice
community.' The farmworker population is low-income and primarily Hispanic,
and is at a disproportionate risk from exposure to an environmental contaminant-
pesticides. 2 Farmworkers face distributional, procedural, corrective, and social
challenges with this exposure, as is common with other environmental justice
communities. Social challenges include socioeconomic and political inequities
that are grounded in the historical domination of the agricultural industry over its
labor force.4 The production and use of pesticides is a function of the economic
priorities of industry. Employers profit from pesticide use and are able to
* Director, Social Policy Division, Center for Governmental Responsibility, Levin College of Law,
University of Florida; B.S., M.A., J.D., University of Florida. The author thanks Melissa Knight for her
research on the Southwest Florida birth defects cases. Portions of this Article were presented as a white
paper and in testimony to the President's Cancer Panel in Indianapolis, Indiana in October 2008. The
author thanks Teresa Niedda, Pamela Rao, the late Shelly Davis of the Farmworker Justice Fund, and
Linda McCauley of Emory University for their helpful comments on the white paper. @ 2012, Joan D.
Flocks.
1. See Thomas A. Arcury & Sara A. Quandt, Pesticide Exposure among Farmworkers and Their
Families in the Eastern United States: Matters of Social and Environmental Justice, in LATiNo
FARMWORKERS IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES: HEALTH, SAFETY AND JUSTICE 106-07 (Thomas A. Arcury
& Sara A. Quandt eds., 2009) [hereinafter LATINO FARMWORKERS]; John Byrne, Cecilia Martinez & Leigh
Glover, A Brief on Environmental Justice, in 8 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DISCOURSES IN INTERNATIONAL
POLICAL ECONOMY, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 6 (John Byrd, Leigh Glover & Cecilia
Martinez eds., 2002); see also Marion Moses, Farmworkers and Pesticides, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTs (Robert Bullard ed., 1993).
2. See Arcury & Quandt, supra note 1, at 107.
3. See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENvnT. L. REP. 10681 (2000)
(characterizing these four components of environmental justice as follows: distributive justice involves
the equitable distribution of environmental burdens and benefits and focuses more on outcomes than on
process; procedural justice involves fairness in the decision-making process rather than on outcomes;
corrective justice focuses on fairness in the way punishments for lawbreaking are assigned and damages
inflicted on individuals and communities are addressed and it can includes elements of retributive,
compensatory, restorative, and commutative justice; and social justice integrates elements of social,
racial, and economic equity into environmentalism).
4. See generally Rachel Morello-Frosch, Discrimination and the Political Economy of Environmental
Inequality, 20 ENV'T & PLANNING C: GOV'T & PoL'Y 477, 485-86 (2002) (describing how the struggle
between capital and labor for control over workplace conditions can lead to inequitable distribution of
environmental hazards).
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maximize their profits through less regulation.5 They are able to circumvent
dissent about pesticide use by exerting social control over the group that they put
at risk-farmworkers.6
The premise of this Article is that social, economic, and political factors
interact in a way that ensures that farmworkers continue to lack participation in
decision-making in pesticide regulation, that disproportionate health impacts are
perpetuated, and that changing the status quo is difficult. Farmworkers have had
little success in addressing harmful occupational pesticide exposure using
methods that some environmental justice communities have employed, i.e.,
lobbying for effective regulation, engaging in public demonstration, or pursuing
traditional litigation.7 In order to find appropriately tailored remedies for this
particular environmental injustice, it is important to recognize that disproportion-
ate pesticide exposure has less to do with a particular framework of regulation
and more to do with underlying social and economic forces.
Part I describes the social and occupational health disparities that farmworkers
face. Part II discusses current political and economic trends, such as the rise of
free trade agreements and national anti-inmigrant sentiment, which have
increased social and economic pressures on the farmworker population and left
them with little power to negotiate workplace conditions. Part III discusses the
failure of regulation allegedly enacted to protect farmworkers from occupational
hazards such as pesticides. Finally, the consequences of the environmental
injustice of farmworker pesticide exposure have dramatic, real-life implications,
which are illustrated by several cases of infants born with severe birth defects to
farmworker women, described in Part IV. Part V concludes by describing
5. See Charles Levenstein & John Wooding, Deconstructing Standards, Reconstructing Worker
Health, in RECLAIMING THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE: THE PoLMcs OF HEALTH IN A ToxIc CULTURE 39,
39-41 (Richard Hofrichter ed., 2000) [hereinafter RECLAIMING THE DEBATE].
6. See id.
7. But cf Benjamin Marquez, Mobilizing for Environmental and Economic Justice: The Mexican-
American Environmental Justice Movement, 9 CAPTIALISM, NATURE, SOCIALSM 43, 57-60 (1998)
(describing successful campaigns by Mexican-American environmental justice organizations affiliated
with the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice).
8. See Levenstein & Wooding, supra note 5, at 40-42; Timothy W. Luke, Rethinking Technoscience in
Risk Society: Toxicity as Textuality, in RECLAIMING THE DEBATE, supra note 5, at 239-41 (discussing how
the current approach to controlling workplace hazards like pesticides is through developing and enforcing
standards, but that this approach objectifies the toxic chemicals and draws attention away from the fact
that their production and use are actually the results of economic and social forces. Creating this
"chemical fetishism" benefits the powerful parties in the work relationship and is detrimental to workers
who must play along with the idea that regulation will protect them instead of challenging the systemic
inequities that allow their health and safety to be compromised in the first place. Luke describes how
gauging the toxicity of chemicals, which is necessary before developing regulatory standards, is always
bereft of certainty and is, in fact, a textual, rather than technical, process that involves constant
interpretations that remain unquestioned. Thus, regarding a pesticide regulation as protective because it is
based on total scientific certainty is erroneous, and can be dangerous and unjust to those the regulation is
assumed to protect); see also Eric K. Yamamoto & Jen-L.W. Lyman, Racializing Environmental Justice,
72 U. COLO. L. REv. 311 (2001) (discussing the importance of contextualizing particular environmental
injustices in order to tailor the most culturally appropriate remedies).
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alternative means of addressing the environmental injustice of farmworker
pesticide exposure when the socioeconomic and political constraints ensure that
regulatory and administrative resolutions will fail. Farmworkers and their
advocates must take advantage of broader alternative social and legal opportuni-
ties to challenge occupational hazards in order to pressure institutions to respond
adequately even in the face of growing pressures on the farmworker community
to maintain the status quo.
I. SociAL AND HEALTH DISPARITIES OF THE FARMWORKER COMMUNITY
It is difficult to enumerate the farmworker population in the United States
because of the fluctuating needs of the agricultural industry and the mobility and
legal status of farmworkers, but advocates estimate that every year between three
and five million people leave their homes to work with agricultural crops.9 This
population is predominately of Mexican origin; in 2001-2002, 75% were born in
Mexico. o In general, farmworkers suffer from poor health, including a higher
prevalence of diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and asthma." Farmworkers are
also susceptible to higher rates of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis,
sexually transmitted disease, and human immunodeficiency virus.12 Many
adverse health problems that farmworker families suffer from are linked directly
to their socioeconomic status. Poverty forces many farmworkers to live in
substandard, unsanitary, and overcrowded housing, which can contribute to a
number of health outcomes such as respiratory illnesses, infectious diseases, and
injury.13 Farmworkers do not have access to adequate health care because they
lack insurance, time off from work, adequate financial resources, ability to
communicate in English, and health care facilities in their rural areas. 14
In addition to poor general health, farmworkers are employed in one of the
most dangerous occupations in the country. In 2006 and 2007, agriculture had
among the highest rates of total recordable, nonfatal occupational injuries and
9. See About America's Farmworkers, NAr'L CTR. FOR FARMWORKER HEALTH, http://www.ncth.org/
?pid=4&page= 1 (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
10. See U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICUL-
TURAL WORKERS SuRvEY (NAWS) 2001-2002: A DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT PROFILE OF UNITED
STATES FARM WORKERS 3 (2005), available at http://www.doleta.gov/agworker/report9/naws-rpt9.pdf.
11. See Migrant Health Problems, MIGRANT CLINICIANS NETWORK, http://www.migrantclinician.org/
issues/migrant-info/health-problems.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
12. See Scott Rhodes, Tuberculosis, Sexually Transmitted Disease, HIV and Other Infections Among
Farmworkers in the Eastern United States, in LATINO FARMWORKERS, supra note 1, at 131-32.
13. See Quirina M. Vallejos, Sara A. Quandt & Thomas A. Arcury, The Condition of Farmworker
Housing in the Eastern United States, in LATINo FARMWORKERS, supra note 1, at 55-56.
14. See Thomas A. Arcury, Melinda F. Wiggins & Sara A. Quandt, Conclusions: An Agenda for
Farmworker Social Justice in the Eastern United States, in LATINO FARMWORKERS, supra note 1, at
222-23.
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illnesses among goods-producing private industry sectors." Injuries and illnesses
in agriculture result from machinery accidents, falls, excessive heat, repetitive
motion, and adverse pesticide exposure. Exposure to pesticides can be dermal,
oral, and respiratory and can occur through direct contact with pesticides during
application, contact with pesticide residue on plants, upon entering a recently
treated area, or through drift from nearby application. 16 Farmworkers' family
members may also be exposed to pesticide residues that are brought home on
farmworkers' clothing, skin, and equipment.17
Pesticide exposure can result in a wide range of acute health effects, including
nausea, dizziness, vomiting, headaches, stomach pain, rashes, and eye prob-
lems.1 s Animal and some human studies have shown that pesticides can also have
chronic effects on the neurological, respiratory, immune, and reproductive
systems and that they can be carcinogenic and mutagenic. 9 Recent research,
such as the Agricultural Health Study, indicates that populations with increased,
15. See Workplace Injury and Illness Rates by Industry in 2007, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICs, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2008/oct/wk4/art0l.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
16. See Brian Mayer, Joan Flocks & Paul Monaghan, The Role of Employers and Supervisors in
Promoting Pesticide Safety BehaviorAmong Florida Farmworkers, 53 AM. J. IND. MED. 814,815 (2010).
17. See Elaine M. Faustman, Susan M. Silbernagel, Richard A. Fenske, Thomas M. Burbacher &
Rafael A. Ponce, Mechanisms Underlying Children's Susceptibility to Environmental Toxicants, 108
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. (SUPP. 1) 13, 17 (2000); Chensheng Lu, Richard A. Fenske, Nancy J. Simcox &
David Kalman, Pesticide Exposure of Children in an Agricultural Community: Evidence of Household
Proximity to Farmland and Take Home Exposure Pathways, 84 ENvTL. REs. 290 (2000); Sara A. Quandt,
Alicia M. Doran, Pamela Rao, Jane A. Hoppin, Beverly M. Snively & Thomas A. Arcury, Reporting
Pesticide Assessment Results to Farmworker Families: Development, Implementation, and Evaluation of
a Risk Communication Strategy, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 636, 637 (2004); Pamela Rao, Amanda L.
Gentry, Sara A. Quandt, Steven W. Davis, Beverly M. Snively & Thomas A. Arcury, Pesticide Safety
Behaviors in Latino Farmworker Family Households, 49 Am. J. INDUS. MED. 271, 272 (2006); Nancy J.
Simcox, Richard A. Fenske, Sarah A. Wolz, I-Chwen Lee & David A. Kalman, Pesticides in Household
Dust and Soil: Exposure Pathways for Children of Agricultural Families, 103 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
1126 (1995); Larkin L. Strong, Beti Thompson, Thomas D. Koepsell & Hendrika Meischke, Factors
Associated with Pesticide Safety Practices in Farmworkers, 51 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 69 (2008).
18. See Donald J. Ecobichon, Toxic Effects of Pesticides, in CASARETT AND DOULL'S TOxIcoLoGY. THE
BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 666, 677 (Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 1996); Thomas A. Arcury & Sara A. Quandt,
Pesticides at Work and at Home: Exposure of Migrant Farmworkers, 362 THE LANCET 2021 (2003);
Linda A. McCauley, W. Kent Anger, Matthew Keiffer, Rick Langley, Mark G. Robson & Diane Rohlman,
Studying Health Outcomes in Farmworker Populations Exposed to Pesticides, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
953 (2006).
19. See Michael C.R. Alavanja, Mustafa Dosemeci, Claudine Samanic, Jay Lubin, Charles F. Lynch,
Charles Knott, Joseph Barker, Jane A. Hoppin, Dale P. Sandler, Joseph Coble, Thomas Kent & Aaron
Blair, Pesticides and Lung Cancer Risk in the Agricultural Health Study Cohort, 160 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 876 (2004); Aaron Blair & Shelia Hoar Zahm, Agricultural Exposures and Cancer, 103
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. (SuPP. 8) 205 (1995); Wojciech Hanke & Johanna Jurewicz, The Risk ofAdverse
Reproductive and Developmental Disorders Due to Occupational Pesticide Exposure: An Overview of
Current Epidemiological Evidence, 17 INT'L J. OCCUPArIONAL. MED. & ENVTL. HEALTH 223 (2004);
Aaron Blair & Sheila Hoar Zahm & Aaron Blair, CancerAmong Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers: An
Epidemiologic Review and Research Agenda, 24 AM. J. IND. MED. 753 (1993) (noting that some of these
studies have linked adult exposure to pesticides with increased rates of central nervous system cancer,
brain cancer, leukemia, germ cell tumors, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, Ewing's sarcoma, Wilms' tumor,
and various birth defects in their children. Childhood exposure to pesticides has been linked to
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regular exposure to pesticides, such as those who work on farms, have higher
rates of some kinds of cancers.2 0 When agricultural chemicals enter the body,
they can also make existing health problems worse. For example, a worker
suffering from heat stress may be more susceptible to pesticide toxicity.2 1 If a
worker's immune system has been weakened by pesticides, then he or she is more
susceptible to other diseases.22 Yet, despite these studies, there is still limited
understanding of the cumulative, additive, synergistic, and chronic effects of
long-term exposure to multiple pesticides among high-risk populations.23
It is likely that many occupational injuries and illnesses are undetected and
unreported for undocumented workers. These workers may be unaware of or
unable to access health care services available to them. They rarely have
insurance or the private resources to pay for health care, they may not have
transportation, they may risk losing their jobs if they take time off to seek health
care, and they may fear that using a public clinic will draw attention to their
undocumented status.2 4 Even when a worker does access medical care, pesticide-
related illnesses may be undetected or unreported, despite laws in some states
requiring such reporting, by health care personnel who do not recognize the
symptoms or are unfamiliar with the reporting requirements.2 5
II. CURRENT POLITICAL AND ECONoMIC TRENDS
Globally, the United States hosts more immigrants from Mexico than any other
Guillain-Barr6 syndrome, brain cancer, leukemia, soft-tissue sarcoma, lymphoma, neurological damage,
and immune system damages).
20. See Michael C.R. Alavanja, Dale P. Sandier, Charles F. Lynch, Charles Knott, Jay H. Lubin,
Robert Tarone, Kent Thomas, Mustafa Dosemeci, Joseph Barker, Jane A. Hoppin & Aaron Blair, Cancer
Incidence in the Agricultural Health Study, 31 SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK, ENV'T & HEALTH (SUPP. 1) 39
(2005). See generally Important Findings from the Agricultural Health Study, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
http://aghealth.nci.nih.gov/results.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
21. See P.N. Viswanathan & C.R. Krishna Murti, Effects of Temperature and Humidity on
Ecotoxicology of Chemicals, in EcOTOXICOLOGY AND CLIMATE 139, 141 (P. Bourdeau, J.A. Haines, W.
Klein & C.R. Krishna Murti eds., 1989); NAT'L RURAL HEALTH CARE Assoc., THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
OF MIGRANT AND SEASONAL FARMWORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES REPORT SUMMARY 9 (2nd ed. 1986).
22. See Robert Reppetto & Sanjay S. Baliga, Pesticides and Immunosuppression: The Risks to Public
Health, 12 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 97 (1997).
23. See Deborah A. Cory-Slechta, Studying Toxicants as Single Chemicals: Does this Strategy
Adequately Identify Neurotoxic Risk?, 26 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 491, 492 (2005); Julie L. Daniels, Andrew
F. Olshan & David A. Savitz, Pesticides and Childhood Cancers, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1068, 1073
(1997); see also Richard A. Fenske, Pesticide Exposure Assessment of Workers and their Families, 12
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 221 (1997).
24. See Mark Berk & Claudia Schur, The Effect of Fear on Access to Care Among Undocumented
Latino Immigrants, 3 J. IMMIGR. HEALTH 151, 155 (2001); Sara R. Cooper, Sharon P. Cooper, Sarah S.
Felknor, Vilma S. Santana, Frida M. Fischer, Eva M. Shipp & Martha S. Vela Acosta, Nontraditional
Work Factors in Farmworker Adolescent Populations: Implications for Health Research and Interven-
tions, 120 PUB. HEALTH REP. 622, 623 (2005).
25. See Rupali Das, Andrea Steege, Sherry Baron, John Beckman & Robert Harrison, Pesticide-
Related Illness Among Migrant Farm Workers in the United States, 7 INT'L J. OCCUPAIONAL. ENVTL.
HEALTH 303, 306 (2001).
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country hosts from all countries combined.26 Mexican citizens have migrated
with or without documentation to the United States in search of employment for
decades.27 At different historical points, economic migration has been officially
endorsed or forgiven, but undocumented migration is mostly publicly discour-
aged while privately tolerated-largely depending on the state of the U.S.
economy and its labor needs.28 Despite predictions that the xenophobia that often
accompanies policies involving immigration reform (such as the 1986 Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act and the 1994 North American Free Trade
Agreement) would curtail Mexico-United States migration, the flow of undocu-
mented Mexican farmworkers into the United States has not responded that
way.29 This is because Mexico-United States migration is correlated with other
factors-such as migrants' transnational social networks,o wage differentials
and employment opportunities, 3 ' and the actual economies of the two countries 32 -
and not with popular sentiment or policy speculation. For example, although
there was much debate about the potential effects of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), part of the speculation was that the agreement would
decrease Mexico-United States migration by promoting economic growth and
employment opportunities in Mexico, thus reducing the impetus to migrate to the
United States for employment.3 3 Instead, some of the policies intended to support
economic growth in Mexico-privatization, land reform, and market integration-
along with a dismantling of the price support and state sponsored activities that
26. See PEw HISPANIC CTR., FACr SHEET- MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008 (2009),
available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/47.pdf.
27. See id.
28. See Patricia Fernandez-Kelly & Douglas S. Massey, Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in
Mexico-U.S. Migration, 610 ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 98, 106-09 (2007); Juan F. Perea, A
Brief History of Race and the U.S.-Mexican Border: Tracing the Trajectories of Conquest, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 283, 303-06 (2003); see also Jorge Durand, Douglas S. Massey & Rene M. Zenteno, Mexican
Immigration to the United States: Continuities and Changes, 36 LATIN. AM. RES. REV. 107, 109-12 (2001)
(Generally, economic migration from Mexico has been encouraged and sometimes officially endorsed
through temporary worker programs when industries cannot find other sources of inexpensive labor. For
example, industrialists sought out workers from Mexico during World War I when they no longer had
access to Eastern and Southern European immigrant labor pools. From 1942-1964, the infamous Bracero
program allowed agricultural employers to recruit temporary farmworkers from Mexico to fill the labor
gap initially left when U.S. citizens were deployed or working in wartime industries. In between these
periods, however, during times of U.S. economic weakness and high unemployment, there have been
surges of anti-immigrant policies resulting in the heightened border control and the deportation of
undocumented workers).
29. See Philip Martin, Mexico-US Migration, in NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
441, 444-49 (Gary Hufbauer & Jeffrey Schotte eds., 2005).
30. See Gordon Hanson, Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE
869, 872 (2006).
31. See id. at 871; RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEw HISPANIC CTR., SURVEY OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS, PARr
THREE: THE ECONOMIC TRANSInON TO AMERICA 6 (2005).
32. See Hanson, supra note 30, at 890 (noting that, "[M]igration is more likely during periods when
U.S. income is expanding relative to income in Mexico."); JEFFREY S. PASSEL & ROBERTO SURO, PEW
HISPANIC CTR., RISE, PEAK, AND DECLINE: TRENDS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION 1992-2004, at 10-12 (2005).
33. See Martin, supra note 29, at 449.
[Vol. XIX260
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promoted the Mexican agricultural industry, created labor displacement and
disruption that increased migration pressures.34
Both documented and undocumented immigration flows from Mexico, like
those from other countries, grew rapidly from the mid-1990s until about 2000. In
2000, a peak in U.S. economic expansion mirrored a peak of migration from
Mexico; nearly 3.4 million U.S. jobs were created and approximately 530,000
migrants arrived from Mexico. Detailed studies of the U.S. labor market during
this recovery phase show that the heightened demand for low-skilled, low-wage
workers occurred not only in the agricultural sector, but in the construction and
hospitality industries as well.3 In 2002, the U.S. economy lost 415,000 jobs and
migration from Mexico declined to 378,000, but as the U.S. economy regained
momentum in 2003 and 2004, the pace of Mexican migration also picked up.37
Undocumented immigration again slowed after 2006 to such an extent that, by
2008, flows were down at least 40% from mid-decade, but flows of legal
permanent residents remained relatively steady.3 8
The basic purpose of NAFTA was to integrate markets among member
countries by mobilizing capital, goods, commodities, services, and information,
but legislators did not attempt to equalize potentially disparate levels of
economic development to the extent needed to prevent increased migration from
Mexico to the United States and Canada.39 In fact, during the years of NAFTA's
existence, U.S. policies have focused on separating labor markets through
increasingly stricter border policies despite the periodic demands for and lure of
low-wage immigrant labor.4 0
About one and a half years after the 9/11 attacks, the newly created
Department of Homeland Security assumed most of the functions of the
dismantled Immigration and Naturalization Services, sending the message that
immigration had become more a matter of national security than a matter of labor
regulation. 4 1 The Border Patrol between Mexico and the United States was
expanded and increasingly militarized, and officers from Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) became notorious for regularly conducting raids at
immigrant workplaces and residences, sometimes using legally questionable
34. See id. at 450; Raul Delgado-Wise, Critical Dimensions of Mexico-U.S. Migration Under the
Aegis of Neoliberalism and NAFTA, CAN. J. DE. STUD. 591, 599 (2004); Fernandez-Kelly & Massey,
supra note 28, at 105-06; ALEJANDRO NADAL, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND INT'L & OXFAM GREAT BRITAIN,
THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ON CORN PRODUCTION IN
MEXICO 7-8 (2000).
35. See PASSEL & SURO, supra note 32, at 10.
36. See KocHHAR, supra note 31, at 14-15.
37. See PASSEL & SuRo, supra note 32, at 3; JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEw HISPANIC CTR.,
MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS: How MANY COME? How MANY LEAVE? 3 (2009).
38. See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 37, at ii.
39. See Fernandez-Kelly & Massey, supra note 28, at 105, 108.
40. See id. at 99.
41. See id. at 108.
No. 2]1 261
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search and seizure methods.4 2 Anti-immigrant sentiment has been reflected in
pecuniary federal legislative attempts and state laws regarding undocumented
immigrants.4 Yet, previous increased border enforcement efforts and heated
debate about immigration reform have had no discernable effect on the pool of
farmworkers-most of these migrants eventually succeed in crossing the
border." What these policies do, however, is arouse anxiety and fears among
those who migrate and force them to go deeper underground, take more risks in
their border crossings, stay longer in the United States, and remain silent and
invisible even when faced with dangerous working conditions.4 5
Proponents of the same market theory that champions free trade agreements
may also argue that workers who take on hazardous conditions, such as
farmworkers, are adequately compensated for their endeavors. The theory of
compensating wage differentials assumes that these workers receive wages that
reflect an acceptance of working conditions.46 This theory claims that the less
risk-averse are paid at a rate commensurate with the risks or conditions they must
face in their jobs.4 7 Yet, this implies that a worker is aware of and accepts the
risks of the worker's occupation, and this is not the case for farmworkers. First,
the risks of pesticide exposure are not fully known, even by medical experts.4 8
Despite regulations requiring employers to provide information to farmworkers
about certain pesticides used at the workplace, the reality is that workers have
42. See id.; CARDOZO IMMIGR. JUST. CLINIC, CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME
RAID OPERATIONS 1 (2009).
43. See Fernandez-Kelly & Massey, supra note 28, at 108 (explaining that in 2007, Arizona adopted
the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) which authorized the state of Arizona to suspend or revoke the
business licenses of employers who knowingly hired unauthorized workers and required all employers
statewide to use the federal government's E-Verify program to confirm the work eligibility of their new
hires); see also ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211-216 (2008) (One week after it was signed, a coalition of
immigrant-rights and business groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, filed a lawsuit to
enjoin the act, arguing primarily that the state act was preempted by federal laws. In February 2008, the
federal district court in Arizona dismissed the lawsuit and, a year later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed that decision in Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009). In
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Whiting, the U.S. Supreme Court majority
affirmed that the portions of LAWA that allowed the state to suspend or revoke business license and
required employers to participate in E-Verify did not preempt federal law. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1972-1973
(2011). Meanwhile, many other states are debating bringing their own Arizona-style immigration laws).
44. See Stephen R. Boucher, Aaron Smith & J. Edward Taylor, Impact ofPolicy Reforms on the Supply
of Mexican Labor to U.S. Farms: New Evidence from Mexico, 29 REv. OF AGRIC. EcON. 1, 14-15 (2006).
45. See id. See generally Luis ALBERTO URREA, THE DEVIL'S HIGHWAY (2005) (providing a true,
harrowing account of twenty-six Mexicans attempting to enter the United States in 2001 via the Sonoran
dessert in Arizona. The group is led astray and fourteen of them-the "Yuma 14"-do not survive the
journey).
46. See PETER DORMAN, MARKETS AND MORTALITY 26 (1996).
47. See id. at 25-31 (discussing many factors, recognized by both economists and non-economists that
affect a "pure" form of this theory. These factors include whether workers can ever be fully informed,
whether collective bargaining can change the properties of market allocation, and whether the hedonic
valuation of life and health is ethical).
48. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-40, PESTICIDES-IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
To ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FARMWORKERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 10-15 (2000) [hereinafter GAO].
[Vol. XIX262
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little access to or understanding of this information and are thus impaired in their
ability to make informed personal risk assessments.49 Even if workers are
informed, perception of and adaptation to environmental risks depend on a
variety of individual, cultural, and structural factors.50 For example, farmworkers
may not take precautions recommended by regulations because they do not feel
they have control over the negative health effects of pesticide exposure at their
worksites5 or access to alternative employment.5 2 There may also be variations
of risk acceptance according to demographics such as gender, class, or
ethnicity.53 In short, the commodification of occupational risk for farmworkers
leads to an inevitable conclusion, as described by economist Peter Dorman:
[S]afe and healthy workplaces are rationed in the same manner as any other
desirable, scarce good. Those who by virtue of class, caste, or simple good luck
are able to acquire safety do so; they are also rewarded with jobs that are more
interesting, skill-enhancing, and better paid. Danger and hardship are the lot of
the poor and powerless. In this way, differences in the level of risk faced by
workers correspond to the other differences in their life chances and thus
compound them.
III. THE FAILURE OF PROTECTIVE REGULATION
If the theory of compensating wage differentials were absolute, there would be
no need for protective occupational health and safety regulation. The theory in a
pure form assumes that workers and employers are in a total contractual state
where workers assume and are compensated fairly for occupational risks.
Regulation would hinder the bargaining process between employees and
employers." The fact that regulation does exist, therefore, must reflect some
inherent recognition that workers are not always on an even bargaining level with
employers, and that some intervention is needed to put them there; regulations
arise to protect potentially less powerful parties. In the case of occupational
health standards, regulation may also exist in recognition of public health as a
common good mandating protection even in spite of workers' own cognitive
49. See Joan Flocks, Paul Monaghan, Stan Albrecht & Alfredo Bahena, Florida Farmworkers'
Perceptions and Lay Knowledge of Occupational Pesticides, 32 J. CMTY. HEALTH 181 (2007).
50. See Elaine Vaughan, Individual and Cultural Differences in Adaptation to Environmental Risks, 48
AM. PSYCHOL. 673, 674 (1993).
51. See id. at 676-77; C. Austin, T.A. Arcury, S.A. Quandt, J.S. Preisser, R.M. Saavedra & L.F.
Cabrera, Training Farmworkers about Pesticide Safety: Issues of Control, 12 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR
& UNDERSERVED 236, 241 (2001).
52. See Elaine Vaughan, Chronic Exposure to an Environmental Hazard: Risk Perceptions and
Self-Protective Behavior, 12 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 74, 82 (1993).
53. See Vaughan, supra note 50, at 673-79.
54. DoRMAN, supra note 46, at 21.
55. See id. at 26.
56. See id. at 28, 127-35.
57. See id. at 186.
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dissonance, and as such it should not be subject to bargaining.5
Successful protective regulation requires that government enforce standards,
that management complies with standards, and that workers are knowledgeable
about standards.5 9 In the case of farmworkers, federal regulation should provide
protection in two ways: directly-by regulating the conditions of exposure, and
indirectly-by providing the resources farmworkers need to achieve some
control over their working conditions. Yet for farmworkers, regulations that
directly involve pesticide exposure are often nonexistent, ineffective, or unen-
forced. 6 0 Furthermore, competitive domestic and international market forces
pressure employers to lobby for less regulation of pesticides and pressure
workers to remain unorganized and silent about workplace safety.61
Farmworkers are exempt from many regulations that could afford indirect
protection under the system of "agricultural exceptionalism," which emerged
during a historical time in the U.S. when institutional discrimination was
accepted and prevalent.6 2 Even when protective regulation does exist, however,
many employers use a variety of practices-such as hiring labor contractors or a
temporary workforce-that allow them to circumvent laws and transfer many of
the physical and economic risks of agricultural employment to the workers.6 3
A. Direct Regulation of Pesticides
In 1947, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)6
was enacted to ensure the effective registration of pesticides containing chemical
ingredients that had been largely created during World War 11.65 In 1970, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established and FIFRA administra-
tion and staff were transferred to it from the United States Department of
58. See id.
59. See Levenstein & Wooding, supra note 5, at 45.
60. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, Pesticide Exposure, and Tort
Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 431, 504 (2004); Shannon
Adair Tool, Farmworkers and FIFRA: Laboring under the Cloud, 31 Sw. U. L. REV. 93, 107-14 (2001).
61. See Levenstein & Wooding, supra note 5, at 45.
62. See Sean A. Andrade, Biting the Hand that Feeds You: How Federal Law has Permitted Employers
to Violate the Basic Rights of Farmworkers and How this Has Begun to Impact Other Industries, 4 U. PA.
J. LAB & EMP. L 601, 606-10 (2002); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 60, at 461-66; Marc Linder,
Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L.
Rav. 1335, 1351-67 (1987); Guadalupe T. Luna, An Infinite Distance?: Agricultural Exceptionalism and
Agricultural Labor, 1 U. PA. J. LAB & EMP. L. 487, 489-95 (1998); Juan F. Perea, A Brief History of Race
and the U.S.-Mexican Border: Tracing the Trajectories of Conquest, 51 UCLA L. REv. 283, 307-09
(2003).
63. See Marc Linder, Crewleaders and Agricultural Sweatshops: The Lawful and Unlawful
Exploitation ofMigrant Farmworkers, 23 CREIGHTON L. REv. 213, 215-16 (1989); Luna, supra note 62, at
494-95; Perea, supra note 62, at 304-07.
64. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2006); 40 C.F.R. §§ 150-189 (2010).
65. See Tool, supra note 60, at 96.
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Agriculture (USDA). 66 At that time, FIFRA focused mainly on issues such as
pesticide labeling and registration and not on workplace safety.67 Later that year,
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) was signed into law.6 8
The OSH Act created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), which had the mandate "to assure as far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions" 69 through the
promulgation and enforcement of occupational safety standards. Although it
seems logical that OSHA would assume regulatory authority over agricultural
workplace hazards such as pesticides, this was not to be the case. The OSH Act
included a clause that prevented the Secretary of Labor from regulating working
conditions when another federal agency had statutory authority to do So.70 The
EPA had been moving in the direction of regulating agricultural pesticide
exposure when it promulgated an early version of the Worker Protection Standard
(WPS) in 1974. Sensing impending negative consequences for farmworkers in
having the EPA administer pesticide safety regulations, two advocacy groups and
a pesticide-affected worker filed an action to compel the Secretary of Labor to
issue permanent farmworker pesticide safety regulations under OSHA, but the
D.C. Circuit held that Congress had conferred authority to regulate pesticides at
agricultural workplaces to the EPA.72 Currently, OSHA maintains only a limited
role in promoting agricultural pesticide safety through provisions such as the
Field Sanitation Standard.
Under FIFRA, there are essentially two avenues of pesticide regulation that
directly affect farmworkers: the registration and re-registration processes 74 and
the WPS.75 According to FIFRA, in order for a pesticide to be distributed or sold,
it must first be registered.76 To register a pesticide, an applicant must submit
information such as the chemical formula, a request that the pesticide be
66. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 60, at 449-52.
67. See id.
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2006).
69. Id. at § 651(b).
70. See id. at § 653(b)(1) ("Nothing in this chapter shall apply to working conditions of employees
with respect to which other Federal agencies, and State agencies acting under section 2021 of title 42,
exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety
or health.").
71. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 60, at 451.
72. See Organized Migrants in Cmty. Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
73. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1928.110-1928.110(c) (2010) (requiring agricultural establishments with eleven
or more employees to provide toilet and hand washing facilities (with a basin, container, or outlet with an
adequate supply of potable water, soap and single-use towels) within a one-quarter-mile walk of each
worker's location in the field. It also requires employers to inform workers of the location of the facilities
and about the importance of good hygiene practices to minimize exposure to the hazards such as
agricultural pesticide residues).
74. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(a), 136(a-1) (2006).
75. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 170.1-170.260 (2010).
76. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(j)(1)(a) (2006) (The regulations regarding registration and re-registration of
pesticides do not encourage decreased use of pesticides nor question the danger of pesticides if not
supported by data. They do not impede marketing of pesticides.).
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classified for general use or for restricted use (or both), the proposed labeling,7 7
and ". . . if requested by the Administrator, a full description of the tests made and
the results thereof upon which the claims are based, or alternatively a citation to
data that appear in the public literature or that previously had been submitted to
the Administrator . . . ." The Administrator shall register a pesticide if the
Administrator is satisfied with the labeling and other material submitted and if the
Administrator determines the pesticide will not cause "unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment." 7 9 The definition of "environment" includes "water,
air, land, and all plants and man and other animals living therein, and the
interrelationships which exist among these."so
There are several concerns regarding the data requirements and other
provisions of the registration process. First, there is much flexibility to the data
requirements, including exemptions, exceptions, and other Administrator discre-
tion regarding the provision of data.8 ' Second, in addressing the proper
registration, labeling, and seizure of misbranded pesticides, the Administrator
can rely on assurances and studies by manufacturers themselves-which creates
a conflict of interest. 82 In fact, the pressure from pesticide manufacturers and
agribusiness in the past has resulted in the EPA streamlining the registration
process. Third, the registration process requires an applicant to submit test data
to the EPA demonstrating that the pesticide will perform its intended function
without unreasonable adverse effects, including reports of acute and chronic
health effects.84 However, as discussed, these data are lacking and there is no
special consideration for people who work daily with these pesticides, such as
farmworkers." Finally, one of the most controversial aspects of the registration
process is that several provisions explicitly describe the consideration of
economic factors such as the benefits of using the pesticide8 6 and the expense of
generating data.87 In other words, the regulation provides for a cost/benefit
77. See id. at § 136a(c)(1)(C) (The contents of the label must include information such as the chemical
ingredients, directions for use, hazard and precautionary statements for humans and domestic animals,
and toxicity level); see also 42 C.F.R. § 156. 10(a) (2010).
78. 7 U.S.C. § 136(c)(1)(F) (2006).
79. Id. at § 136a(c)(5)(D) (Additionally, the Administrator "shall not make any lack of essentiality a
criterion for denying registration of any pesticide" and "and "may waive data requirements pertaining to
efficacy").
80. Id. at § 136(j).
81. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 60, at 449-52.
82. See Tool, supra note 60, at 104.
83. See id. at 93-94.
84. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 60, at 449.
85. See id. at 440-48.
86. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (stating that "[t]he term 'unreasonable adverse effects on the environment'
means (1) any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide . . .").
87. See id. at § 136a(c)(2)(A) (stating that the Administrator shall develop guidelines that specify what
kinds of information will be required to support the registration and that in developing these guidelines,
"the Administrator shall consider the economic factors of potential national volume of use, extent of
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analysis that weighs the unreasonable risk to humans or environment against the
beneficial commercial use of the pesticide in question. Yet, the adverse effect of
pesticides on workers is a public health matter, and it is questionable whether it
should be subject to an economically driven calculation."
The second FIFRA component that directly impacts farmworkers and pesticide
safety is the WPS, which was expanded in 1992 to include not only workers
performing hand labor in fields and nurseries, but also those who mixed and
applied pesticides.89 According to the WPS, the specific means by which an
employer is required to protect farmworkers include: enforcing entry time
restrictions into pesticide treated areas; 90 providing posted and/or oral notice
about treated areas to farmworkers; 91 providing information about applied
pesticides in a centrally located area;92 and providing training with specific
instructions about how farmworkers can protect themselves from pesticides.
The WPS also requires employers to provide sufficient direction about the
regulation to supervisors of workers and to require those supervisors to assure
workers' protection and compliance with the regulations.94 Employers are
directed, in the event of a poisoning, to provide prompt transportation from the
workplace to an emergency medical facility where the employer shall inform the
treating medical personnel of the type of pesticide involved and the circum-
stances of exposure.95
Several evaluations have questioned whether the WPS has succeeded in
protecting farmworkers from pesticide exposure.9 6 In particular, the quality and
effectiveness of WPS training for farmworkers has been questioned. Researchers
have found that employer training may be nonexistent, minimal, or in a format
that does not guarantee that workers actually learn anything. There are many
practical considerations that prevent farmworkers from complying with safety
recommendations as well. For example, farmworkers may not have access to
facilities where they can wash their hands during the workday or to washing
distribution, and the impact of the cost of meeting the requirements on the incentives for any potential
registrant to undertake the development of the required data").
88. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 60, at 449-51; Tool, supra note 60, at 103-06.
89. See A. LARSON, AN ASSESSMENT OF WORKER TRAINING UNDER THE WORKER PROTECTION
STANDARD, FINAL REPORT To THE U.S. EPA 1 (2000).
90. 40 C.F.R. § 170.112 (2010).
91. Id. at § 170.120.
92. Id. at § 170.135.
93. Id. at § 170.130.
94. Id. at § 170.7.
95. Id. at § 170.160.
96. See GAO, supra note 48, at 16-23.
97. See T.A. Arcury, Sara A. Quandt, Colin K. Austin, John Preisser & Luis F. Cabrera,
Implementation of EPA's Worker Protection Standard Training for Agricultural Laborers: An Evaluation
using North Carolina Data, 114 PUB. HEALTH REP. 459, 467 (1999); LARSON, supra note 89, at 62-68.
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machines or showers after work.98 Furthermore, several investigations suggest
that perceived control over the ability to protect oneself from pesticide exposure
is strongly correlated with behavior and that farmworkers do not feel a sense of
control at their workplaces.99 Finally, the WPS requires that technical, accurate
pesticide safety information be communicated through employers and supervi-
sors, thus assuring that farmworkers are dependent on these parties for their
personal safety. 00
Another major criticism of the WPS has to do with states' role and history in
enforcement. Under FIFRA, primary authority to enforce pesticide regulations is
devolved to the states under a cooperative federalism scheme in which the EPA
retains overseer capacity to ensure that states continue to meet the federal
standards.'0o The anticipated benefit of devolving environmental statutes is that
decision-making is moved closer to an affected public and thus will be more
efficient and democratic. 10 2 This again assumes, however, that the affected public
has full access to information about an issue and that the overseer federal agency
follows through when needed on its ability to withdraw a state's authority. If this
does not occur, the fear is that the states will engage in a race to the bottom and
that a nationally inconsistent pattern of monitoring practices will emerge. Indeed,
this is reported to be the case with the WPS and FIFRA's labeling and use
requirements, with detrimental results including: a lack of a standardized
monitoring; lack of inspections; unpenalized violations; underreported viola-
tions; lack of worker training; lack of posting of information; and early re-entry
into treated work areas.10 3
B. Indirect Regulation
In addition to regulations that directly address occupational pesticide usage,
there is legislation that can afford workers occupational protection by allowing
them to exercise more control over their workplaces. For example, workers who
can engage in dialogue and bargaining with their employers are better able to
98. See T.A. Arcury, Sara A. Quandt, Altha J. Cravey, Rebecca C. Elmore & Gregory B. Russell,
Farmworker Reports of Pesticide Safety and Sanitation in the Work Environment, 39 AM. J. IND. MED.
487, 491-93 (2001); Mayer et al., supra note 16, at 819-21.
99. See T.A. Arcury, Sara A. Quandt & Gregory B. Russell, Pesticide Safety among Farmworkers:
Perceived Risk and Perceived Control as Factors Reflecting Environmental Justice, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 233 (2002); Austin et al., supra note 51, at 236-49.
100. See Mayer et al., supra note 16, at 821-22; see also Charlene Bryan, Michael R. Lasarev, Linda
A. McCauley, Jennifer A. Scherer & Diana Sticker, Pesticide Knowledge and Risk Perception Among
Adolescent Latino Farmworkers, 8 J. AGRIc. SAFETY & HEALTH 397, 404-07 (2002).
101. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(W)(1), (2)(w-1)-136(w-2) (2006).
102. See Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 351, 373-74
(2000).
103. See Arcury et al., supra note 97, at 459; Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 60, at 455-60;
SHELLEY DAVIS & REBECCA SCHLEIFER, FARMWORKER JUST. FUND, INDIFFERENCE TO SAFETY. FLORIDA'S
INVESTIGATION INTO PESTICIDE POISONING OF FARMWORKERS 1-6 (1998); GAO, supra note 48, at 20-23.
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ensure that there are adequate health and safety measures or that they are being
proportionately compensated for occupational risks. Since the 1930s, the rights
of U.S. workers to organize, engage in collective bargaining and work stoppage
methods, and receive a minimum wage and overtime pay have been protected by
federal laws such as those that eventually evolved into the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)'" and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 0 5 But even
with the inception of these laws, Congress failed to extend their protections to
farmworkers under the doctrine of agricultural exceptionalism-a practice that
historically emerged from negotiations between Southern politicians seeking to
protect agriculture's access to cheap labor (which at the time was predominately
African-American) and Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration attempting to
promote New Deal social and economic reform. 10 6 The outcome of this policy
was institutional discrimination and its legacy remains in place today. 07
For example, the NLRA provides important legislative protection for workers.
It recognizes that strikes and other forms of work disruption resulting from
uneven bargaining between workers and employers are detrimental to com-
merce. 08 To discourage such disruption, the NLRA seeks to level the playing
field for workers by protecting their right to associate, organize, select
representatives, and, most importantly, engage in collective bargaining.' 09 But
the NLRA explicitly excludes farmworkers.ix0 It is very difficult for farmworkers
to organize without legal protection against employer retribution, and the result
has been that while the nation's other workers are able to engage in collective
action to increase their salaries and improve their working conditions, farmwork-
ers often have had to fight just to be paid their existing wages.111 Unorganized
workers who fear employer retribution will not press for increased safety
measures at the workplace.' 1 2
The FLSA recognizes that working conditions that reduce the standard of
living necessary for the health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers can
eventually interfere with productive commerce.113 Thus, the FLSA seeks to
protect commerce by regulating working conditions such as minimum wage,114
104. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
.105. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
106. See Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act, supra note 62, at 1351; Perea,
supra note 62, at 307.
107. See Perea, supra note 62, at 307-08.
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
109. See id.
110. See id. at § 152(3) ("The term 'employee' . . . shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer. . .").
111. See Andrade, supra note 62, at 606-10; Perea, supra note 62, at 308.
112. See Alicia Chavira-Prado, Work, Health, and the Family: Gender Structure and Women's Status
in an Undocumented Migrant Population, 51 HuM. ORG. 53, 58 (1992).
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
114. Id. at § 206.
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overtime pay,' 1 recordkeeping,116 and youth employment"'7 for employees in
private and public industry." 8 Originally, farmworkers were excluded from the
FLSA, but in 1966 Congress amended the Act, extending the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the Act to the majority of farmworkers." 9 However,
farmworkers are still subject to exclusions. For example, certain farmworkers can
be exempt from minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor provisions. 12 0
C. Other Factors that Complicate Protection
Even where protective legislation does exist for farmworkers, agricultural
employers have historically used labor arrangements that can circumvent this
regulation by shifting the risks of farmwork away from the employer onto other
parties. Such practices include temporary worker programs and the use of labor
contractors (also known as "crewleaders").121 Temporary worker programs have
been a mainstay of the agricultural industry since the 1940s, when the Bracero
program was initiated. 12 2 This program resulted from bi-national agreements that
allowed Mexican citizens to migrate into the United States and work as
temporary farmworkers. 12 3 While this stream of accessible labor was originally
justified as necessary to replace the United States citizens that had become
involved in World War II and in wartime industries,' 24 the arrangement was
extended for more than two decades and was fraught with exploitative
practices.12 5 Employers had maximum control over their workforce and intro-
duced the piece rate system of compensation and production quotas.12 6. All
contracts were renewable, but temporary, and the competition for these jobs
discouraged labor organizing.1 2 7 Temporary worker programs have recently
gained popularity again among employers concerned about tightening immigra-
tion controls that could limit their access to cheap labor. As with the Bracero
program, the current programs benefit employers by ensuring a stream of
available, documented workers, but they also allow those employers to maintain
115. Id. at § 207.
116. Id. at § 211.
117. Id. at § 212.
118. Id. at § 203(e)(1)-(5).
119. See Perea, supra note 62, at 308.
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(c).
121. See Linder, Crewleaders and Agricultural Sweatshops, supra note 63, at 216-17; Perea, supra
note 62, at 304-05.
122. See Andrade, supra note 62, at 609-14; Perea, supra note 62, at 304-06.
123. See Andrade, supra note 62, at 609.
124. See Lorenzo A. Alvarado, A Lesson from my Grandfather The Bracero, 22 CHICANO-LATINo L.
REv. 55, 57-59 (2001).
125. See Andrade, supra note 62, at 609-12.
126. See id.
127. See Alvarado, supra note 124, at 60-64; Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions:
Hoffnan Plastic Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court's Role in Making
Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2003).
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maximum control over their workforce while discouraging collective action or
expression of workers' rights.12 8
Employers hire crewleaders to recruit, manage, pay, and fire farmworkers. 1 2 9
The practice of using crewleaders is indicative of an unorganized, irregular, and
relatively powerless workforce,130 and it has increased with the rise of restrictive
immigration policies that pressure employers to avoid hiring undocumented
workers. 31 The practice allows employers to be insulated from workers, shift
responsibility for occupational safety onto workers, and avoid liability for
regulatory violations involving matters such as training, injuries, and lost
wages.13 2 It also has the potential of being highly exploitative and even
dangerous for workers. In the past fifteen years, for example, prosecutors have
brought numerous cases in Florida against unscrupulous crewleaders charged
with crimes including extortion, kidnapping, illegal use of firearms, involuntary
servitude, smuggling, and peonage-against members of their crews. 13 3
IV. BIRTH DEFECTS CASE STUDIES
For farmworkers, the potentially adverse health effects of pesticide exposure
and the systemic failures of a protective scheme were dramatically illustrated by
several cases of infants born with severe birth defects to farmworker families in
southwest Florida, near the town of Immokalee. According to the Coalition of
Immokalee Workers (CIW), a community-based farmworker organization head-
quartered in Immokalee, Southwest Florida is the state's most important center
for agricultural production, and Immokalee hosts the state's largest farmworker
population.13 4 Many of the farmworkers in this area work for large-scale tomato
and citrus operations and may also travel along the entire East Coast to follow
harvesting seasons.'13  Some farmworkers eventually move out of agricultural
128. See Alvarado, supra note 124, at 71-73.
129. See Andrade, supra note 62, at 617 (In addition, crewleaders are responsible for contributing any
required benefits and withholding income taxes for the workers they hire).
130. See Linder, Crewleaders andAgricultural Sweatshops, supra note 63, at 216-17.
131. See Luna, supra note 62, at 494-95.
132. See Andrade, supra note 62, at 616-17; Linder, Crewleaders andAgricultural Sweatshops, supra
note 63, at 216-17.
133. See CIWAnti-Slavery Campaign, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://www.ciw-online.org/
slavery.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012) (The Coalition of Immokalee Workers, a community-based
farmworker organization located in Southwest Florida, has assisted the prosecution with many cases and
summarizes them on their website); see also JOHN BowE, NOBODIES: MODERN AMERICAN SLAVE LABOR
AND THE DARK SIDE OF THE NEw GLOBAL ECONOMY 1-78 (2008); BARRY ESTABROOK, TOMATOLAND: How
MODERN INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE DESTROYED OUR MOST ALLURING FRUIT 73-96 (2011); Modem Day
Slavery: A Special Report, PALM BEACH POST, http://www2.palmbeachpost.com/modemdayslavery/
index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012) (In 2003, the Palm Beach Post published a comprehensive
investigation of the impact of modern-day slavery on Florida's farmworkers).
134. See About CIW, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://www.ciw-online.org/about.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2012).
135. See id.
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work and into other low-wage work such as that in the construction and service
industries. 13 6 From 2005-2009, the regional media focused on six cases of
infants born between late 2004-2006 with a range of birth defects. The first of
these infants was, Carlos "Carlitos" Candelario, born on December 17, 2004,
with Tetra-amelia syndrome (characterized by the absence of all four limbs).137
On February 4, 2005, Jesus Navarrete was born with Pierre Robin syndrome
(characterized by an underdeveloped jaw, retraction of the tongue, and upper
airway obstruction).' 3 8 Two days later, on February 6, 2005, an infant was born
with multiple malformations-no nose, one ear, one kidney, a cleft lip and palate,
and a lack of visible sex organs. 139 The third infant was at first named Jorge, but
hours later renamed Violeta after her gender was finally determined.14 0 Because
of the severity of the birth defects, Violeta died within three days. 41 The
common threads among these first three reported cases were that the parents of all
of the infants lived within 200 feet of each other at the same Immokalee migrant
labor camp; they were all from Mexico; and they all picked tomatoes for the same
produce company, Ag-Mart, in the same fields in Florida and in North
Carolina. 142 Most important, however, was that during the organogenetic period
of pregnancy (days fourteen to fifty-nine, when birth defects are most likely to
occur in a fetus) all three mothers worked in the same tomato fields not knowing
that the areas had been recently treated with pesticides, including some that had
been shown to be teratogenic in animals. 14 3
In March 2005, the Palm Beach Post broke the story of the three infants and
began what would become years of coverage about the cases'" that eventually
called into question the efficacy of the Florida Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services' (FDACS) monitoring of pesticide use and enforcement of
federal pesticide laws. 1 4 5 Around this time, the Collier County Health Depart-
136. See id.
137. See Geoffrey M. Calvert, Walter A. Alarcon, Ann Chelminski, Mark S. Crowley, Rosanna
Barrett, Adolfo Correa, Sheila Higgins, Hugo L. Leon, Jane Correia, Alan Becker, Ruth H. Allen &
Elizabeth Evans, Case Report: Three Farmworkers Who Gave Birth to Infants with Birth Defects Closely




140. See John Lantigua, Why was Carlitos Born this Way? PALM BEACH POST (Mar. 16, 2005),
www.palmbeachpost.com/localnews/contentlocal-news/epaper/2005/03/13/s lacarlitos_0313.html.
141. See Calvert et al., supra note 137, at 788.
142. See Christine Evans, Three Babies, Countless Tears, PALM BEACH POST, June 12, 2005, at Al;
Lantigua, supra note 140.
143. See Calvert et al., supra note 137, at 787-88.
144. See Lantigua, supra note 140.
145. See FLA. STAT. §§ 487.011-487.2071 (2011) (In Florida, the Bureau of Compliance Monitoring,
Division ofAgricultural Environmental Services (AES), conducts field inspections to ensure compliance
with the Florida Pesticide Law. Inspections and investigations are performed to determine "compliance
with requirements covering worker protection, pesticide registration, proper pesticide use and applicator
licensing"); John Lantigua & Christine Stapleton, Florida Pesticide Monitoring Draws Fire, PALM
BEACH POST, Apr. 24, 2005, at Al; About FDACS, FLA. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS.,
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ment (CCHD), FDACS, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human
Services (NCDHHS), and the North Carolina Department of Agricultural and
Consumer Services (NCDACS) also become aware of the cases.146 Shortly
thereafter, a joint investigation into Ag-Mart's pesticide operations commenced
among Florida state agricultural inspectors and local and state health inspec-
tors. This investigation would later include Ag-Mart operations in North
Carolina as well.' 4 8 In September 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) was alerted and assisted state health departments in Florida
and North Carolina with the medical case reports of the infants. 14 9
In early October 2005, the CCHD announced that "[t]he absence of any acute
systemic effects reported in the mother's health and medical history, the diversity
of and type of malformations involved, and the timing of potential exposures do
not support or establish a causal association between the birth defects of concern
and potential pesticide exposure in Florida." 50 In May 2006, NCDHHS also
concluded that: "It cannot be determined with certainty whether maternal
pesticide exposure caused birth defects in any of the case-infants because of the
small number of cases, the lack of complete information on exposure dosage, and
http://www.freshfromflorida.com/about-fdacs.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2012) (Farmworker advocates
and the media in Florida have long questioned whether there is a conflict of interest in housing the office
that enforces pesticide regulation within the agency charged with protecting the agricultural industry);
Abundance of Poisons, Shortage of Monitoring, PALM BEACH POST BLOG (May 1, 2005, 6:30 PM),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/blogs/content/shared-blogs/palmbeach/editorial/entries/2005/05/
abundance.of-po.html (In 2005, the Palm Beach Post reported that its investigation revealed that,
"problems with the system exist from the farm field to the seats of government: failure to document
exposures, failure to investigate properly those that are discovered, failure to hold growers
responsible for violating federal pesticide laws, failure of the medical community to notify the state
of possible pesticide cases, failure of state legislators to fund adequate protection and failure of the
federal government to properly monitor the state's performance"); Field Inspection, FLA. DEP'T OF
AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERV., Div. OF AGRIC. ENVTL. SERVS., BUREAU OF COMPLIANCE MONITORING,
http://www.flaes.org/complimonitoring/fieldinspection.html (last visited on Jan. 27, 2012) (The
Bureau states, "(T)hrough a cooperative agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Bureau also documents violations of federal pesticide laws and rules. Case files which
involve such violations may be submitted to the EPA for enforcement action." But the Division of
AES is part of the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS) and part of
the stated mission of FDACs is "to safeguard the public and support Florida's agricultural economy
by . . . assisting Florida's farmers and agricultural industries with the production and promotion of
agricultural products").
146. See Calvert et al., supra note 137, at 787.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. (The CCHD, NCDHHS, and Florida Department of Health reviewed medical records for
the three mothers and their infants. CCHD interviewed all six parents and NCDHHS interviewed the
parents of Carlitos and Jesus. A University of Florida clinical geneticist and professor of pediatrics and
genetics reviewed case summaries obtained from the medical records and provided the descriptions of the
birth defects. Exposure information was obtained from NCDACS and FDACS. These agencies obtained
pesticide application and worker assignment records from Ag-Mart).
150. COLLIER CNTY. HEALTH DEP'T, INVESTIGATION INTO THE OCCURRENCE OF CONGENITAL MALFORMA-
TIONS IN IMMOKALEE, COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA (2005) [hereinafter CCHD REPORT].
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other variables."' 5 ' In May 2007, local, state and federal health officials involved
in the investigation in both states published a case report in the peer-reviewed
journal, Environmental Health Perspectives (EHP), that confirmed ". . . the evi-
dence available is inadequate to establish a causal relationship with pesticide
exposure." 5 2
Despite their conclusions, the authors of the North Carolina report and the
EHP article qualified their findings' and included strongly worded observations
about systemic failures and recommendations to prevent future birth defects
cases. 1 5 4 Farmworker advocates were critical about the depth of the investiga-
tion'5 5 and noted that the results came after Ag-Mart itself announced it would
voluntarily discontinue its use of five chemicals that had been linked to birth
defects.15 6 Others questioned the assumption that current pesticide regulations
151. OCCUPATIONAL & ENvTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY BRANCH Div. OF PUB. HEALTH, N.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERvs., ASSESSMENT OF MATERNAL OCCUPAnONAL PESTICIDE ExPosURES DURING PREGNANCY AND
THREE CHILDREN WITH BIrTH DEFECTS: NORTH CAROLINA, 2004 (2006) [hereinafter NCDHHS REPORT].
152. Calvert et al., supra note 137, at 790.
153. See id. at 788, 790 ("Three farmworkers giving birth to infants with birth defects within an
8-week period is cause for concern. In Florida, approximately 3% of live births have major birth defects.
There is evidence to suggest that the three observed major birth defects exceed this expected rate." The
Article continues to describe the myriad of general barriers to making a complete scientific evaluation of
birth defects cases, including: lack of information on the fertility rates among female farmworkers in
Florida, lack of precise etiology of most human birth defects, lack of human epidemiological studies
linking pesticide exposure to reproductive toxicity, and a lack of knowledge about the teratogenicity of
synergistic pesticide exposure. The Article also describes shortcomings of their specific evaluation,
including: inability to fully characterize the birth defect risk of a cohort of Ag-Mart employees, inability
to determine the possibility of undetermined birth defects that could appear in the future, inability to
conduct evaluations of genetic causes, reliance on company records of exposures, difficulties in
extrapolating high dose animal cases to human cases, and the lack of information on paternal exposure);
see also NCDHHS REPoRr, supra note 151, at 25 (describing some of these same barriers and limitations.
The report also pointed out that the observation that none of the mothers in the cases appeared to have
experienced acute pesticide toxicity was flawed for two reasons: First, the women may not have
recognized symptoms of pesticide toxicity such as nausea or headaches, which could have been attributed
to pregnancy. Also, farmworker access to health care is often limited (in fact, none of the three
case-mothers received prenatal care prior to the second trimester of pregnancy), and, even when care is
available, physicians may not recognize pesticide-related illnesses. Second, there is evidence from
animal studies and human experience that a fetus can be harmed without obvious toxicity in the mother.).
154. See Calvert et al., supra note 137, at 790 (Observations included a discussion about the dangers
of failure to comply with existing pesticide regulation, poor enforcement standards, and improper
pesticide applications, as well as the importance of farmworker training, access to prenatal health care,
and adequate surveillance for all pesticide-related illnesses); NCDHHS REPORT, supra note 151, at 26-27
(The North Carolina report included specific state-level recommendations).
155. See Laura Layden & Janine Zeitlin, Health Officials: Pesticides Not Likely at Fault for Birth
Defects, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2005), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2005/oct/13/
health.officials.pesticidesnotlikely-faultbirth/ (reporting the late Shelly Davis, then Deputy Director
of the Farmworker Justice Fund in Washington D.C., stated that the CCHD report barely probed the link
between exposure and the birth defects: 'They conclude it was not likely to have been pesticides but they
don't give any evidence to back that up ... They have not even scratched the surface").
156. See Christine Stapleton & Christine Evans, Tomato Grower Drops Suspect Pesticides, PALM
BEACH PosT, Oct. 1, 2005, at Al (noting the five chemicals Ag-Mart discontinued included: Sencor,
Monitor, Penncozeb, Vydate, and Agri-Mek. However, Ag-Mart refused to discontinue Methyl Bromide,
one of only six conventional agricultural chemicals that have been suspected to carry reproductive risks
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are protective of a developing fetus and expressed concern about the same
limitations that the reports described, such as the facts that the investigators relied
on application records provided by Ag-Mart (that were subsequently questioned
by the company itself for accuracy) and that there was a lack of exposure
assessment for the fathers of the children. 5 7
One hour after the CCHD released its findings, FDACS announced it had
issued two Administrative Complaints against Ag-Mart and named employees
who were pesticide applicators at two company locations. The complaints alleged
eighty-eight separate violations of state pesticide laws, 15 8 and FDACS levied a
fine of $111,200-believed at the time to be the largest of its kind imposed by
FDACS.'5 9 A day after the Florida announcement, NCDACS issued a Notice of
Violation to Ag-Mart for a record 369 violations of state pesticide laws and a fine
of $189,500. 160
Some of the violations that could have directly impacted workers, such as the
aforementioned pregnant women, included disregard of the WPS provisions
regarding pesticide safety training; failure to display information about applied
pesticides and observe the Restricted Entry Interval (REI); improper pesticide
handling; unsafe operation of equipment; unavailability of decontamination
supplies; use of prohibited mixtures of certain pesticides; and over-application of
some pesticides.16 1 Of particular concern at the time of the investigations were
the alleged REI violations. Regulations regarding the REI are contained within
the WPS, which states: "After the application of any pesticide on an agricultural
establishment, the agricultural employer shall not allow or direct any worker to
enter or to remain in the treated area before the restricted-entry interval specified
when applied at high dosage levels. Ag-Mart stated that it could not find a suitable and cost-effective
replacement for Methyl Bromide, a soil fumigant banned in the United States except for emergency or
"critical use" exemptions. Andrew B. Yaffa, attorney for Carlitos' parents, stated that the company's
decision to eliminate some pesticides [was] "essentially an admission that the chemicals they've been
knowingly exposing these workers to do cause harm.").
157. See FAWN PArTISON, AGRIc. RES. CTR./PESTICIDE EDUC. PROJECT, SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF
NORTH CAROLINA'S REPORT ON PESTICIDES AND BIRTH DEFECTS AMONG THREE AG-MART WORKERS (2006).
158. See Recommended Order, Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Ag-Mart Produce, Inc, 2007
WL 868589 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 2007).
159. See Christine Evans, Christine Stapleton & John Lantigua, State Fines Ag-Mart $111,200 for
Pesticide Violations, PALM BEACH POsT, Oct. 13, 2005, at Al.
160. See Christine Evans, Christine Stapleton & John Lantigua, Ag-Mart also Accused of Violations in
N.C., PALM BEACH POST (Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.smfws.com/artlO142005c.htm; John Lantigua,
Ag-Mart fined $931,000 in New Jersey, PALM BEACH POST (Jan. 30, 2009). www.palmbeachpost.com/hp/
content/state/epaper/2009/01/30/0130agmart.html; Christine Stapleton, Pesticide Cloud Hangs over
Ag-Mart's Florida-Grown Santa Sweets Tomatoes, PALM BEACH POST (Dec. 20, 2005), http://
www.palmbeachpost.comlocalnews/contentlocal-news/epaper/2005/12/20/claSantaSweets_1220.
html (In 2009, the. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection levied a fine on Ag-Mart for
$931,000-for serious pesticide violations including denying state environmental inspectors access to
facilities, losing track of toxic compounds, failing to properly ventilate areas during pesticide use, and
using forbidden mixtures of chemicals).
161. See Calvert et al., supra note 137, at788.
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on the pesticide labeling has expired, except as provided in this section."1 6 2
Calvert explained that, according to company records provided during the
initial investigations, the three mothers were exposed to potentially teratogenic
pesticides early in their pregnancy, during organogenesis, and had even worked
with these pesticides in fields where the REI had not yet expired.163 For example,
the fungicide Mancozeb has caused limb defects and cleft palate in laboratory rat
studies.16 According to records, Carlitos' mother had possibly worked up to four
days in fields in violation of the REI for Mancozeb.16 5 There is animal evidence
that the pesticide Methamidophos can cause anotia (missing ears), anencephaly
(missing forebrain), paddle-shaped limbs, and microphthalmia (small eyes).16 6
The mother of Violeta worked for at least three days in violation of the REI for
Methamidophos and the mother of Jesus for at least one day.' 67
In December 2006, an administrative judge in North Carolina recommended
that 271 of the 369 North Carolina violations against Ag-Mart be dropped and
that the fine be reduced.16 8 In March 2007, an administrative judge in Florida
recommended that eighty-one of the eighty-eight Florida violations be dropped
and that the fine be reduced to a total of $11,400.169 In October 2007, a second
administrative judge in North Carolina recommended that the remaining
violations in that state be reduced to seventeen and the fine reduced to $6,000.170
The recommendations for dismissal were based on several factors, but the most
compelling were Ag-Mart's allegations that state investigators had misinterpreted
the company's records regarding where the three women were working at the
times in question; that the company provided a spreadsheet listing all the fields
the women might have been working in and the investigators interpreted that data
to show definite locations of the women. 171 In Florida, FDACS used these
records to form the administrative complaints against Ag-Mart, but it had the
162. 40 C.F.R. § 170.112 (2010).





168. See Kristin Collins, Ruling Benefits Ag-Mart, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Jan. 4, 2007),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2007/01/04/4601 1/ruling-benefits-ag-mart.html.
169. See Laura Layden, Judge: Drop Most Violations Against Ag-Mart, NAPLES NEWS (Mar. 23,
2007), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2007/mar/23/judge-drop-most violations against agmart/.
170. See Kristin Collins, Judge Faults Case against Ag-Mart, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct. 9, 2007),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2007/10/09/96048judge-faults-case-against-ag-mart.html.
171. See Recommended Order, supra note 158 (Count 38 of the Order states "The president of
Ag-Mart, Mr. Long, confirmed that Ag-Mart does not keep records on which fields a worker is in on a
given day. At the time the Department made its request, Mr. Long told [Ag-Mart human resource
manager] Ms. Cassell that there was no way Ag-Mart could provide such precise worker location data.
The closest they could come would be to correlate harvest or receiving data, which showed what
plantings a crew had harvested from, with the workers' time cards." Count 48 alleges, "Ms. Fernandez,
the case reviewer whose analysis led to the filing of the Administrative Complaints against Ag-Mart,
believed the field location spreadsheets prepared by Ms. Cassell and her staff reflected the actual work
locations for [the three mothers]." Finally, Count 51, states ". . . while Ag-Mart is at fault for not
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burden to prove its allegations against the company by clear and convincing
evidence in order to impose a fine. Its reliance on records that were, by the
company's own admission, faulty did not establish that level of proof.17 2
The administrative judge's recommendations were not binding-the cases had
to go back to their respective state agricultural departments. In North Carolina,
the case continued when the state Pesticide Board rejected the administrative law
judge's recommendations and agreed to hold a hearing on some of the
violations. 1 73 In September 2008, the Pesticide Board began its hearing, which
included testimony from Carlitos' parents. It finally voted unanimously to settle
the case for $25,000 in June 2010.174
Reaction to the birth defects cases was not confined to the media and state
agencies. In October 2005, Florida-based Publix Super Markets, one of the top
ten grocery store chains in the United States, announced that it would no longer
sell Ag-Mart's popular Santa Sweets grape tomatoes. 7 5 In November that year,
Wal-Mart, the nation's largest retailer, and its affiliate warehouse club, Sam's,
stopped selling Santa Sweets, and Costco Wholesale Corp., the nation's largest
warehouse club operator, stopped selling the grape tomatoes in its Florida
stores. 17 6 Meanwhile, a social worker assisting the parents of Carlitos, Abraham
Candelario and Francisca Herrera, contacted a private attorney, Andrew Yaffa, on
their behalf.177 Before he could proceed with litigation, Yaffa had to convince
Carlitos' parents that they had legal rights despite their undocumented status. 7 8
He assured them that he would do everything he could to help them and that he
explaining itself clearly, the Department [FDACS] is also at fault for insisting that the spreadsheet be
taken at face value, no matter how implausible the result.").
172. See Recommended Order, supra note 158, at Count 93 (The company records were also used by
the CDC and state health departments in their investigations); Calvert et al., supra note 137, at 787;
Layden, supra note 169.
173. See Kristin Collins, State to Rethink 271 Charges in Ag-Mart Case, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Feb.
13, 2008), http://www.newsobserver.com/2008/02/13/42222/state-to-rethink-271-charges-in.html (The
North Carolina Pesticide Board is a seven-member, governor-appointed board charged with the duty of
administering the North Carolina Pesticide Law of 1971. The members represent different sectors of the
regulated public. Members are appointed from the North Carolina Department of Agriculture &
Consumer Services (1), The Department of the Environment and Natural Resources (1), The State Health
Director or his designee and an individual representing an environmental protection agency (1), the
agrochemical industry (1), the farm population (1), nongovernmental conservationist (1), and an at-large
member representing the general public. See N.C. Pesticides Board, N.C. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER
SERVs., http://www.ncagr.gov/SPCAP/pesticides/board.htm).
174. See Renee Chou, State Agrees to Settle Ag-Mart Pesticide Case, WRAL.com (June 9, 2010),
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/7751302/.
175. See Christine Stapleton, Christine Evans & John Lantigua, Publix Drops Ag-Mart Tomatoes,
PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 22, 2005, at Al (Publix resumed stocking Santa Sweets in December 2005).
176. See Stapleton, supra note 160.
177. See ESTABROOK, supra note 133, at 38-40 (describing Yaffa's first meeting with Francisca
Herrera).
178. See Telephone Interview with Andrew B. Yaffa, Partner, Grossman & Roth, P.A. (Apr. 23, 2008)
[hereinafter Yaffa Interview].
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was confident the case would succeed. 17 9 He quelled their fears of employer
retaliation and deportation by convincing them to leave Ag-Mart and move to an
undisclosed location for the duration of the lawsuit.s 0 In February 2006, Yaffa
filed suit against Ag-Mart in Hillsborough County, Florida Circuit Court on
behalf of Carlitos and his parents, seeking damages for medical and hospital
costs, lifetime care costs, disability, disfigurement, pain and suffering, mental
anguish, and, eventually, punitive damages. 18 The case was based on premises
liability, which allowed plaintiffs to avoid the complicated burden of proving the
elements of causation required in toxic tort cases.18 2 In this way, the civil lawsuit
avoided the pitfall that the state investigators encountered in the administrative
courts when they relied on Ag-Mart's poor records of applications and worker
locations. 18 3
In March 2008, the plaintiffs reached a confidential settlement with Ag-Mart
Produce, Inc. on behalf of Carlitos.184 The terms of the settlement were
confidential but the plaintiff, Herrera, agreed that it was enough to care for
Carlitos for the rest of his life.185 In addition, the Tampa-based Shriner's
Children's Hospital in Tampa and Miami Children's Hospital agreed to provide
179. See id.
180. See id. (According to Yaffa, Carlitos' parents were actively recruited by labor contractors and
brought into the country by coyotes (human smugglers who arrange border crossings). They dealt in
silence with the substandard living and working conditions as they paid back the debt the coyotes claimed
they incurred. Like most undocumented farmworkers, if Carlitos' parents believed they were being
adversely exposed to pesticides at the workplace, they would not report the situation out of fear of
employer retaliation and possible deportation).
181. See id.; Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Damages at 9-10, Francisca Herrera, Abraham
Candelario & Carlos Herrera-Candelario v. Ag-Mart Produce, Inc., No. 06-001725 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 13,
2008); John Lantigua, Farmworkers Sue Grower over Baby's Birth Defects, PALM BEACH PosT (Mar. 2,
2006), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/hp/content/local-news/epaper/2006/03/02/slb-carlitos_0302.html.
182. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Damages, id. at 3-6 (Generally, in a premises
liability case, the owner of property owes a duty of reasonable care to prevent injury to a person whose
presence is known to the landowner and the injury is caused by the active conduct or the landowner. In the
current case, plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Ag-Mart owed a legal and common law duty of reasonable
care to provide reasonably safe conditions for the unborn Carlitos and to warn of hazardous conditions
within the Defendant's foreseeable zone of risk, that the Defendant breached that duty of care, and that as
a direct and proximate result of that breach, Carlitos sustained injury); CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFEN &
EILEEN GAUNA, ENvTL. JusT.: L., Poi', & REG. 261-63 (2003) (Had Plaintiff brought a toxic tort claim,
Plaintiff would have had to prove both general causation-that the pesticides to which Herrera was
exposed were capable of causing the type of injuries alleged (birth defects) at the levels of exposure
alleged, and specific causation-that Herrera's exposure actually caused the alleged injuries).
183. See Yaffa Interview, supra note 178 (Instead, the broader theory allowed Yaffa to rely on general
evidence developed that Ag-Mart's management was aware that the pesticides being used were toxic, that
they allowed the pesticides to be applied close to workers, and that they that allowed other unsafe
pesticide practices. Farmworkers like Carlitos' parents were sprayed without any education, without any
informed choice about whether to be exposed to the spray or not).
184. See John Lantigua & Christine Stapleton, Suit Over Limbless Boy, 3, Settled, PALM BEACH PosT
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care for Carlitos until he is 18.186 In March 2009, the Palm Beach Post reported
that three new birth defects cases had been filed in circuit courts in Collier and
Hillsborough counties.187 In one case, three-year-old Juan had multiple surgeries
for a cleft lip and palate, and has brain damage; in another, three-year-ofd
Yiovanni was diagnosed at birth with Dandy Walker Syndrome (a congenital
brain malformation); and in the third case, a girl, Dahlia, was born with a
deformed ear and defective liver. 8s
V. CONCLUSION
Community residents, activists, advocates, and researchers involved in environ-
mental justice cases have achieved some measured successes using a variety of
strategies such as lobbying, obtaining injunctive relief, demonstrating dispropor-
tionate links between environmental risks and race/class, and even litigation.189
However, the particular social, economic, and political factors that affect
farmworkers, particularly undocumented ones, limit their access to these
strategies. In contrast to a residential community, an occupational community
such as that of farmworkers is often expected to assume certain work-related
risks in exchange for compensation, but this expectation presumes that risks are
known and willingly assumed. Although no workplace is risk-free, it is unlikely
that parents would willingly undertake a risk if they knew it would result in harm
to their children. Likewise, it is hard to imagine than an employer would
willingly subject an employee to a risk if the employer knew it would harm a
child. 190 The fact that the birth defects cases described above occurred shows not
only that there are many unknown risks and not enough precaution with pesticide
exposure, but also that farmworkers are a highly vulnerable community that is
clearly not compensated enough for undertaking one of the riskiest occupations
in the country. Farmworkers as a group have less ability to participate in political
decision-making, less data and access to knowledge about occupational hazards,
186. See id.; Christine Stapleton, Ag-Mart to Pay for Limbless Child's Needs, PALM BEACH PosT (Apr.
17, 2008), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/state/content/state/epaper/2008/04/17/wla_CARLITOS_
AGMART_0417.html.
187. See Christine Evans & John Lantigua, Toxic Pesticides Debate and Pregnant Florida
Farmworkers Rekindled with Three New Lawsuits, PALM BEACH POST (Mar. 14, 2009), http://
www.palmbeachpost.com/news/content/local-news/epaper/2009/03/14/0314migrant.html.
188. See id.
189. See Sherry Cable & Donald W. Hastings, Diferent Voices, Different Venues: Environmental
Racism Claims by Activists, Researchers, and Lawyers, 9 HUM. ECOL. REv. 26, 34-36 (2002) (The
admittedly limited successes have been hindered, however, by a lack of coordination and interaction
between the various parties).
190. See Ag-Mart Can't Prevent Employees who are Pregnant from Working, PALM BEACH POST, Dec.
16, 2005, at I lA (noting that throughout the extensive media coverage and subsequent investigations of
the birth defects cases, Don Long, president of Ag- Mart, where the mothers worked, maintained that the
company's primary concern was the safety of their employees and finding out whether there was a link
between pesticide use and the children's health).
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less control over their workplaces, and less opportunity to organize and challenge
the power structure. Although decades of progressive policymaking should have
resulted in increased protection for these disenfranchised workers, the situation
instead has grown more precarious. International trade agreements have affected
migration trends, and simultaneous anti-immigrant policies in the U.S. have
driven undocumented workers further underground, rendering them voiceless.
Furthermore, the framework of regulatory protection is specious. It appears to be
neutral and to allow for participation in the decision making process. But if
pesticide regulation were displayed on a continuum from the time a substance is
registered to the time a farmworker has a potential adverse exposure, one would
find a series of systemic deficiencies. This particular regulatory failure begins at
the federal level, where human health is not valued as a public good, but instead
is weighed against industry's economic interests, and continues with the
relegation of administrative and enforcement responsibilities to state agencies
that have the potential for conflicts of interest. Finally, even when the
mechanisms for protection exist, employers are able to circumvent them through
labor practices that reduce employer responsibility for and diminish workers'
control over workplace conditions.
This convergence of systemic failures at so many levels was tragically
illustrated by the birth defects cases. After the intense media scrutiny and
investigation of the cases, it initially appeared that there was progress in
improving the situation for farmworkers. The public was made more aware of
farmworker pesticide exposure; Ag-Mart announced it would discontinue the of
use of certain chemicals linked to birth defects in lab animals; administrative
agencies levied fines against Ag-Mart for its regulatory violations; large retailers
stopped selling some Ag-Mart tomatoes; and FDACS stated that it would request
more funding to increase the number of pesticide inspectors. But some of these
reactions were fleeting and likely initiated only to counter bad publicity rather
than as a commitment to improve farmworker safety.191 Even the successful
settlement was limited in this respect. Although the plaintiffs' attorney used an
innovative legal strategy, it is difficult to predict the long-term, environmental
justice impact of individual lawsuits and settlements in cases involving farm-
worker pesticide exposure.
In situations involving large communities facing pernicious environmental
inequities, traditional strategies singularly employed by activists, researchers,
and lawyers have been limited.19 2 It is suggested that these stakeholders would
achieve more success if they pursued broader, more integrated, and innovative
strategies.19 3 For activists, these strategies include focusing on systemic inequi-
ties that intertwine with and perpetuate environmental injustice, and making
191. See Evans & Lantigua, supra note 187.
192. See Cable & Hastings, supra note 189, at 35-36.
193. See id. at 36-38.
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domestic and international links with broader constituencies from a variety of
ethnic groups and social classes. 19 4 For researchers, these strategies include using
community-based participatory methods that integrate affected community
members into all components of the research."'
In environmental justice cases, lawyers can also bring about more effective
and sustainable impacts by using methods similar to those employed by
community-based participatory researchers, including strategies that are client-
centered and that involve effective use of public awareness.196 Environmental
justice researchers have recognized that traditional litigation may not be the best
way to bring about the widespread structural change that is ultimately needed.' 9
Traditional environmental laws, however advanced they are, were not designed
by or for environmental justice communities, and they do not address the
systemic issues underlying injustices such as farmworker pesticide exposure.1
The late environmental justice advocate Luke Cole theorized that whereas
environmentalists may see contamination as a failure of government and industry
to regulate, environmental justice activists see it as a government and industry
success in that it represents the status quo of industry maximizing profits by
externalizing costs.1 99 Like other industries, the agricultural industry legitimizes
the use of pesticides by claiming that toxins are necessary and inevitable and that
if regulations are followed there is little danger.2 0 0 But the toxic risk assessment
of a chemical, upon which regulation is based, establishes only whether a single,
particular contaminant endangers health in particular ways. 2 0 1 Regulation does
not acknowledge problems if there is no existing scientific evidence indicating a
problem could occur, even if there are cases of people becoming sick or
experiencing health issues after an exposure.2 02 The government has regulated as
if it has certainty, and with no public recognition that nothing is certain about
pesticides. The system continues as long as no one gets hurt, or rather, as long as
those who are hurt remain silent.
Farmworker exposure to pesticides is as much a product of social and
economic relations as it is a legal issue. Even if it were solely a legal issue, the
legal sphere, including the approach offered by traditional litigation, often
194. See id; COAL. OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, supra note 134; About Us, FARMWORKER Ass'N OF FLA.,
http://www.floridafarmworkers.org/index.php/about-us (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
195. See Liam R. O'Fallon & Allen Dearry, Community-Based Participatory Research as a Tool to
Advance Environmental Health Sciences, 110 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 155 (2002).
196. See Cable & Hastings, supra note 189, at 37.
197. See id. at 35-36; Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need
for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 641-42 (1992).
198. See Cole, supra note 197, at 642.
199. See id. at 643-44.
200. See Mary H. O'Brien, When Harm is not Necessary: Risk Assessment as Diversion, in
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reinforces the existing social and economic status quo.203 Any type of litigation
for an environmental injustice can shift control of the situation away from the
affected community into the courts; cost communities precious time and
resources; fail to achieve what the community needs in the first place-especially
when the problem involves deeper social and political factors; and, in the end,
lead to community disempowerment. 204 Nearly twenty years ago, Cole proposed
a framework for environmental justice cases that used legal strategies as a means,
in conjunction with other types of advocacy, to bring about systemic change.2 0 5
He proposed an "environmental poverty law" that would address three questions
historically used by activists to evaluate strategies for social change: 1. Will it
educate people? 2. Will it build the movement? and 3. Will it address the root of
the problem, rather than merely a symptom? 2 0 6
An advocate seeking to help bring about a resolution to the problem of
farmworkers and pesticide exposure would be well-guided by using these
questions when forming a strategy, as well as by seeking out community, activist,
and researcher partners to better triangulate an approach. Such an approach
would help gain the trust of affected farmworkers and encourage them to come
forward and participate in the advocacy. Farmworker trust is essential, but
difficult to foster in the current social and economic environment. As the mother
of Carlitos said after the settlement was announced: "There are many more with
problems out there. But they are afraid to come forward."20 7 With the assistance
of committed, aware advocates, however, farmworkers can challenge the
structures that envelop their community and shift the power relations that keep
them subject to toxic harm.
203. See Cole, supra note 197, at 648 ("[U]sing a legal strategy, rather than a political one, would
likely fail these communities: a legal victory does not change the political and economic power relations
in the community that led to the environmental threat in the first place.").
204. See id. at 650-5 1; Francis Calpotura, Why the Law? 5 THRD FORCE MAG. 1, 52 (1994).
205. See Cole, supra note 197, at 661-68.
206. See id. at 668.
207. Stapleton, supra note 160.
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